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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina recently clarified how
appellate courts should review the constitutionality of punitive damages,' the
legislature is primed to change the law in this area with a bill that would increase
the difficulty for plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages. The supreme court's
opinion in Mitchell v. Fortis Insurance Co.3 held that the three guideposts from
BMW ofNorth America v. Gore4 are the predominant test of the constitutionality
of punitive damages in South Carolina5 and that appellate courts should review
punitive damages awards de novo.6
The importance of Mitchell does not rest entirely on the holdings, but also
rests on the clarity the court provided. South Carolina courts have used the Gore
1. See Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 587, 686 S.E.2d 176, 185 (2009).
2. See H.R. 3375, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S. 22, 119th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011).
3. 385 S.C. 570, 686 S.E.2d 176 (2009).
4. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
5. Mitchell, 385 S.C. at 587, 686 S.E.2d at 185.
6. Id. at 583, 686 S.E.2d at 182.
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guideposts since the late 1990s7 and have acknowledged that federal courts
review punitive damages de novo, but never before had the supreme court
explicitly declared what the guidelines were in South Carolina and how they
should be applied.
However, with all the clarity that Mitchell brings, the South Carolina
General Assembly may make punitive damages more difficult for plaintiffs to
obtain by passing the South Carolina Fairness in Civil Justice Act of 2011.9 The
Act implements strict guidelines on pleading for punitive damages and caps
punitive damages at the greater of three times the compensatory damages
awarded or $350,000.10
Section II of this Note lays out the framework for a punitive damages review
that the United States Supreme Court has developed over the last fifteen years
and discusses a South Carolina Supreme Court case that, up until Mitchell,
played a large role in South Carolina punitive damages award reviews. Section
III analyzes two pre-Mitchell South Carolina Supreme Court punitive damages
award decisions to demonstrate the tests that the court employed in punitive
damages award reviews prior to Mitchell. Section IV analyzes the holdings and
reasoning of Mitchell, explaining the new and more efficient punitive damages
award review that Mitchell laid out. Section V examines the proposed South
Carolina Fairness in Civil Justice Act of 2011, and Section VI briefly analyzes
the effect it may have on future punitive damages awards if passed. Finally,
Section VII concludes.
II. GAMBLE, GORE, AND CAMPBELL: THE FRAMEWORK OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
LAW
Gamble v. Stevenson, a 1991 South Carolina Supreme Court case, was a
landmark opinion for punitive damages in this state. In Gamble, the court set out
eight considerations for a trial court to follow in determining whether a punitive
damages award violates the Due Process Clause:
7. See Collins Entm't Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 355 S.C. 125, 140, 584
S.E.2d 120, 128 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575); Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279,
307, 536 S.E.2d 408, 422-23 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575); Lister v. NationsBank
of Del., N.A., 329 S.C. 133, 151, 494 S.E.2d 449, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at
575).
8. James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 195, 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2006) (citing
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)); Atkinson v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 361 S.C. 156, 166, 604 S.E.2d 385, 390 (2004) (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at
418).
9. See H.R. 3375, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S. 22, 119th Gen. Assemb.,
reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011).
10. Id.
11. 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991).
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(1) defendant's degree of culpability; (2) duration of the conduct; (3)
defendant's awareness or concealment; (4) the existence of similar past
conduct; (5) likelihood the award will deter the defendant or others from
like conduct; (6) whether the award is reasonably related to the harm
likely to result from such conduct; (7) defendant's ability to pay; and
finally, (8). . . "other factors" deemed appropriate. 12
From 1991 to 1996, these eight considerations formed the basis for South
Carolina courts' review of punitive damages awards.13
In 1996, in BMW of North America v. Gore,14 the United States Supreme
Court used three "guideposts" to determine the constitutionality of punitive
damages: "the degree of reprehensibility of the [defendant's conduct]; the
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the]
punitive damages award; and the difference between [the punitive damages
awarded] and the [punitive awards] authorized or imposed in comparable
cases."15 The South Carolina Supreme Court responded to Gore by instituting
an approach that used both the eight Gamble considerations and the three Gore
guideposts.16 There were difficulties with this approach, however, because
practitioners were unsure which test would receive more weight.17
In 2003, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,18 the
United States Supreme Court provided guidance regarding the determination of
reprehensible conduct and insight into what qualified as an acceptable punitive
damages ratio.19 The Court specified five factors relevant to determining if a
defendant's conduct is reprehensible:
12. Id. at 111-12, 406 S.E.2d at 354.
13. See, e.g., Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 400, 403
(D.S.C. 1992) (using Gamble's eight considerations in determining the constitutionality of a
punitive damages award); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Love Chevrolet, Inc., 324 S.C. 149,
154, 478 S.E.2d 57, 59 (1996) ("In light of Gamble, there are now three stages in this state to a trial
court's review of punitive damages. First, the court must determine whether the defendant's
conduct rises to the level of culpability warranting a punitive damage award... . Second, the trial
judge must conduct a post-trial Gamble review to ensure that the award does not deprive the
defendant of due process. If the award is determined to violate the defendant's due process rights,
then the trial court must either grant a new trial absolute, or a new trial nisi remittitur. If the award
is determined not to violate the defendant's due process rights, then the trial court reaches the third
inquiry, to wit, whether, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds the award excessive or
inadequate.").
14. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
15. Id. at 574-75.
16. See, e.g., James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 195, 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2006)
("Although we find the punitive damages award was reasonable under the Gamble factors, we must
also review the trial court's ruling on punitive damages under Gore.").
17. See William J. Watkins Jr., Don't Gamble on Due Process Review ofPunitive Damages,
S.C. LAW., Jan. 2007, at 37, 41 ("A definitive word is needed from the state Supreme Court to guide
the trial bench and bar on due process review of punitive damages.").
18. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
19. Id. at 419, 425.
2011] 609
3
Brannon: Punitive Damages in South Carolina: With Clarity Comes Uncertaint
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[W]hether ... the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit, or mere accident.20
The court also established that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages ... [would] satisfy due process."21
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S APPROACH TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEFORE MITCHELL
Prior to Mitchell, the South Carolina Supreme Court had used the Gamble
considerations, the Gore guideposts, and the Campbell factors to review punitive
damages awards; thus, practitioners could not accurately predict which case
would weigh most heavily in the court's analysis. For example, in Atkinson v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 22 the court's analysis rested on the Gore guideposts
and Campbell factors, but in James v. Horace Mann Insurance Co.,2 the court
used both Gore and Gamble.
A. Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co.
In 2004, in Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., the South Carolina
Supreme Court considered whether a punitive damages award was excessive and
whether it violated due process.24 Atkinson involved a fraudulent breach of
contract by Orkin.25 Orkin failed to honor the provision in a termite bond that
allowed the Atkinsons to have the bond transferred to them from their home's
previous owners.26 Instead, Orkin offered the Atkinsons "a new contract with
less desirable terms." 27 The Atkinsons denied the offer and purchased a policy
from Terminix.28 Terminix denied the Atkinsons full coverage because of
substantial termite damage to the structure of the home. 29  This came as a
surprise to the Atkinsons because before they purchased the home, "Orkin
conducted a routine inspection and reported that the residence was free of
termites and termite damage."30  The Atkinsons brought suit against Orkin
20. Id. at 419.
21. Id. at 425.
22. 361 S.C. 156, 604 S.E.2d 385 (2004).
23. 371 S.C. 187, 638 S.E.2d 667 (2006).
24. Atkinson, 361 S.C. at 164, 604 S.E.2d at 389.
25. Id. at 160, 604 S.E.2d at 387.
26. Id at 160-61, 604 S.E.2d at 387.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 161, 604 S.E.2d at 387-88.
29. Id. at 161, 604 S.E.2d at 388.
30. Id
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claiming breach of contract and negligence for failure to disclose the termite
damage in the inspection.31 The trial court awarded the Atkinsons $6,191 in
compensatory damages and $786,500 in punitive damages, a 127-to-i ratio. 32
In its review of the punitive damages award, the South Carolina Supreme
Court primarily looked to the three Gore guideposts and the ratio guideline in
Campbell.33 In its application of the first Gore guidepost-the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct-the court acknowledged Cambell's five
reprehensibility factors, but did not utilize them in its analysis. Instead, it
focused on whether the trial court improperly used any of Orkin's past
misconduct to amplify the reprehensibility of its misconduct in this case.3 5
Next, the court looked to the second guidepost-the disparity between the
plaintiffs harm or potential harm and the punitive damages award-and held
that a 127-to-i ratio of compensatory to punitive damages was presumptively
36unconstitutional. The court relied on the principle from Campbell that "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages ... [would] satisfy due process." 37 The court held "that the Atkinsons
have failed to rebut the presumption that the three-digit, punitive-compensatory
damages ratio[] in this case is unconstitutional." 38
For the third Gore guidepost-the disparity between the punitive damages
awarded in the present case and the punitive damages awarded in similar cases-
the court examined two previous cases involving fraudulent breach of contract
and determined that the compensatory-punitive damages ratio in each of those
cases was far less than in the present case.39
B. James v. Horace Mann Insurance Co.
In contrast to the court's approach in Atkinson, in James v. Horace Mann
Insurance Co. the South Carolina Supreme Court utilized both Gamble and
Gore.40 Here, the plaintiff-homeowners' dog bit James Geiger in 2002.41 The
31. Id. at 160-161, 387-88.
32. Id. at 164, 604 S.E.2d at 389.
33. Id. at 165-71, 604 S.E.2d at 390-93.
34. Id. at 167-69, 604 S.E.2d at 391-92.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 170, 604 S.E.2d at 392.
37. Id. at 170, 604 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425).
38. Id. at 171, 604 S.E.2d at 393.
39. Id. Specifically, the court examined the compensatory-punitive damages ratio in Cock-
N-Bull Steak House, Inc. v. Generali Insurance Co., 321 S.C. 1, 466 S.E.2d 727 (1996), and in
Pinckney v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 268 S.C. 430, 234 S.E.2d 654 (1977). In Cock-N-Bull, the
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a compensatory damages award of $52,000 and a punitive
damages award of $1,500,000. Cock-N-Bull, 321 S.C. at 3-4, 466 S.E.2d at 728-29. In Pinckney,
the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a compensatory damages award of $5,000 and a punitive
damages award of $4,000. Pinckney, 268 S.C. at 431, 234 S.E.2d at 654.
40. James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 195, 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2006).
41. Id. at 191, 638 S.E.2d at 669.
2011] 611
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plaintiffs submitted a claim under their homeowner's insurance policy to Horace
Mann Insurance Company.42 A Horace Mann adjuster told Geiger that the
company would not pay the $25,000 in liability coverage available under the
plaintiffs' policy unless Geiger could provide further proof of the plaintiffs'
negligence.43 Consequently, Geiger sued the homeowners and obtained a verdict
for $50,500.44
Thereafter, the homeowners brought a declaratory judgment action against
Horace Mann claiming that the adjuster mishandled the claim by telling Geiger
that he had to show proof of negligence to receive the $25,000. This
information was incorrect because South Carolina law imposes strict liability on
46
dog owners for injury arising from a dog bite. Geiger testified that if he had
been notified of the correct law by the adjuster he would have settled and not
sued the homeowners. 4 7 The trial court found Horace Mann liable for bad faith
and awarded the homeowners $146,600 in actual damages and $1,000,000 in
48punitive damages, a 6.82-to-I ratio.
The court began its analysis with the eight Gamble considerations. 4 9 It noted
that upholding a punitive damages award does not require a finding of fact for
each Gamble consideration5 0 and that the amount of damages still "remains
largely within the discretion of the jury. . .,,5 1 The court held that the punitive
damages award did not violate due process under Gamble because Horace Mann
continuously misrepresented the law to Geiger and denied him payment based on
the misre resentation.52 This misrepresentation constituted "extremely culpable"
behavior. 3
In language critical to the confusion that Mitchell would later clarify, the
court next stated, "[A]lthough we find the punitive damages award was
reasonable under the Gamble factors, we must also review the trial court's ruling
on punitive damages under Gore."54 The court then conducted a brief analysis of
the three Gore guideposts. For the first guidepost, it found Horace Mann's
conduct reprehensible and determined that the punitive damages award did not
violate due process under Gore55 because the adjuster "repeatedly falsely
42. Id.
43. Id. at 191-92, 638 S.E.2d at 669.
44. Id at 192, 638 S.E.2d at 669.
45. Id at 192-93, 638 S.E.2d at 669-70.
46. Id. at 192, 638 S.E.2d at 669 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110 (1987)).
47. Id.
48. Id at 193-94, 638 S.E.2d at 670.
49. Id at 194-95, 638 S.E.2d at 671.
50. Id. at 195, 638 S.E.2d at 671 (citing McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 321 S.C. 340, 346, 468
S.E.2d 633, 637 (1996)).




55. Id at 195-97, 638 S.E.2d at 671-72.
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represented the applicable law from the time he was assigned the claim"56 and
because Horace Mann based its denial on the adjuster's misrepresentation.s7
Furthermore, Gei er would not have sued the homeowners absent the
misrepresentation. The court did not mention the five Campbell
reprehensibility factors.59
For the second guidepost, the court relied heavily on the single-digit
principle provided in Campbell and determined that the 6.82-to-i ratio was
"reasonably related to the actual harm suffered."60
For the third guidepost, the court looked to section 38-2-10 of the South
Carolina Code, which imposes on insurers a penalty of $15,000 for non-willful
conduct that violates the insurance laws and $30,000 for willful conduct.61 The
court determined that these "statutory penalties [were] set at 'such a low level,
there [was] little basis for comparing [them] with any meaningful punitive
damage award."' 62 Notably, the court did not compare the punitive damages
award at issue with awards in comparable cases.
IV. MITCHELL V. FORTIS INSURANCE Co.
In Mitchell v. Fortis Insurance Co., the South Carolina Supreme Court
answered the question of whether Gore or Gamble carries more weight in a
63review of punitive damages awards. In adopting Gore as the predominant test,
the court laid out a clear and formulaic approach to reviewing awards.
64
A. Facts
Jerome Mitchell, Jr., a seventeen-year-old incoming college freshman,
applied for a health insurance policy from Fortis Insurance Company on May 15,
2001.65 The application included the following question: "Been diagnosed as
having or been treated for any immune deficiency disorder by a member of the
medical profession?" Mitchell answered "no." Fortis accepted Mitchell's
application and provided him with a health insurance policy.67




60. Id. at 196, 638 S.E.2d at 671-72.
61. Id. at 197, 638 S.E.2d at 672 (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-2-10 (2002)).
62. Id. (quoting Collins Entm't Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 355 S.C. 125,
142, 584 S.E.2d 120, 129 (Ct. App. 2003)).
63. See Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 587, 686 S.E.2d 176, 185 (2009).
64. See id. ("We now hold that Gamble remains relevant to the post-judgment due process
analysis, but only insofar as it adds substance to the Gore guideposts.").
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On May 13, 2002, after attempting to donate blood to the Red Cross,
68Mitchell learned that his blood screened positive for HIV. Mitchell
immediately contacted a physician, and on May 14, the physician's tests
confirmed that Mitchell was HIV positive.69 During this visit, however, one of
the physician's assistants erroneously dated Mitchell's chart May 14, 2001,
70rather than May 14, 2002. On May 23, 2002, an infectious disease specialist
confirmed Mitchell's diagnosis and entered another file detailing the diagnosis.
Fortis began to receive the claims for Mitchell's HIV treatment.72 Pursuant
to company policy, Fortis investigated whether Mitchell failed to disclose the
illness on his application as a preexisting condition.73 In June 2002, a Fortis
investigator obtained Mitchell's medical records and discovered the erroneously
dated chart marked May 14, 2001, one day before the date of Mitchell's
application.74 The information was sent to a Fortis senior underwriter, who
recommended to Fortis's rescission committee that Fortis rescind Mitchell's
policy for his failure to disclose his disease.75 The underwriter based her
recommendation solely on the erroneously dated chart.76 At trial, Mitchell's
insurance expert testified that once an investigator found a single piece of
evidence supporting rescission, the investigator concluded the investigation.77
On September 4, 2002, the rescission committee held a two-hour meeting in
78which it considered Mitchell's case along with forty-five other cases. The
committee approved rescission of Mitchell's policy.79 Based on the fact that the
committee decided forty-five cases in the two-hour meeting, Mitchell argued at
trial that the insurer could not have spent more than three minutes on his case.so
Upon receiving notice of the rescission, Mitchell attempted to inform Fortis
that he did not misrepresent his disease status, but Fortis offered him no
assistance. Mitchell then turned to Hope Health, a free medical clinic, for
assistance.82 The manager of the clinic called Fortis to inform it that there were
several records proving that Mitchell was diagnosed with HIV after Mitchell
filed his application; the manager even offered to send them to Fortis.83 Fortis
68. Id
69. Id. at 577-78, 686 S.E.2d at 180.







77. Id. at 580, 686 S.E.2d at 181.
78. Id. at 579, 686 S.E.2d at 180-81.
79. Id at 579, 686 S.E.2d at 181.
80. Id. at 581, 686 S.E.2d at 182.
81. Id. at 579, 686 S.E.2d at 181.
82. Id.
83. Id
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"spurned" this offer, however, and supplied no information about Mitchell's
right to appeal.84
In June 2003, a letter from Mitchell's attorney to Fortis finally motivated
Fortis to review Mitchell's case. The review resulted in Fortis affirming the
rescission of Mitchell's policy.86 Consequently, Mitchell filed suit the following
month, alleging breach of contract and bad faith rescission of his policy.
87
B. Analysis
The court began its analysis by adopting the de novo standard of review as
the standard for assessing the constitutionality of a trial court's award of punitive
damages.88 Quoting from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,89 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a de novo review was the correct standard because (1) concepts
in a punitive damages analysis are "fluid concepts that take their substantive
content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed";
(2) "independent review is . . . necessary if appellate courts are to maintain
control of, and to clarify, the legal princiles"; and (3) a "de novo review tends
to unify precedent and stabilize the law." Accordingly, the court abrogated use
of the abuse of discretion standard9 that it had embraced in Gamble v.
Stevenson.92 Next, the court announced that the Gore guideposts would provide
the predominant framework for review of punitive damages awards, and that the
Gamble considerations would remain relevant only in cases where they added
substance to the guideposts.9 3 The court also indicated that the five
reprehensibility factors and ratio rinciples from Campbell would remain
integral to the review of awards. Ultimately, the court reasoned that
"considerations of judicial economy weighed in favor of a less burdensome and
duplicative analysis."
84. Id. at 579-80, 686 S.E.2d at 181.
85. Id at 580, 686 S.E.2d at 181.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id. at 583, 686 S.E.2d at 182.
89. Id (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001)).
90. Id at 583, 686 S.E.2d at 183 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 582-83, 686 S.E.2d at 182.
92. 305 S.C. 104, 112, 406 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1991) ("[O]nly when the trial court's discretion
is abused . . . does it become the duty of this Court to set aside the award." (citing Fennell v.
Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 202 125 S.E.2d 408, 415 (1962))).
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C. Application
The court then applied the first Gore guidepost. 95 In so doing, it examined
Fortis's conduct under each of the Campbell reprehensibility factors. 96 The first
reprehensibility factor-whether the harm was physical as opposed to
economic-seemed at first to weigh against Mitchell because his harm, the loss
of health insurance, was economic. However, by denying Mitchell health
insurance, Fortis also "exposed him to the great risk of physical danger" because
without medical treatment, his HIV could progress more quickly.98
The second reprehensibility factor-"whether Fortis demonstrated an
indifference to Mitchell's life and a reckless disregard to his health and safety"
weighed heavily in Mitchell's favor. 99 Fortis rescinded Mitchell's policy
knowing that he had HIV; thus, Fortis showed that they were not concerned with
Mitchell's health, safety, and life expectancy.1oo If Mitchell had not been able to
obtain medical services from Hope Health, his condition undoubtedly would
have worsened during the period that Fortis withheld coverage. 101 Further,
because "Fortis deliberately ignored contextual and other evidence" when it
rescinded Mitchell's policy, it was indifferent to its contractual bligations. 102
The third reprehensibility factor-whether Mitchell was financially
vulnerable-was evident through his need to obtain medical services from Hope
Health's free clinic.103 The fourth reprehensibility factor-whether Fortis's
conduct included repeated actions-also weighed heavily in favor of Mitchell.104
Fortis's indifference toward Mitchell's condition took place over two years.10s
Even after Mitchell's attorney brought the erroneous date to the rescission
committee's attention, the committee still rejected Mitchell's claim. 106
The final reprehensibility factor-whether Mitchell's harm was the result of
intentional malice-also favored Mitchell.10 7 Fortis's investigator acknowledged
in her report that whether Mitchell's HIV diagnosis predated his claim was
unclear; however, the committee rescinded the policy anyway.108 The Fortis
investigator also ignored the efforts of Mitchell, his Hope Health case worker,
his mother's insurance agent, and his attorney to solve the misunderstanding and
95. See id. at 589, 686 S.E.2d at 186.
96. Id at 589-90, 686 S.E.2d at 186.







104. Id at 589-90, 686 S.E.2d at 186.
105. Id at 589, 686 S.E.2d at 186.
106. Id at 589-90, 686 S.E.2d at 186.
107. Id. at 590, 686 S.E.2d at 186.
108. Id
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provide information that would show the date was a mistake. 109 Further, Fortis
refused to conduct any further investigation, failed to inform Mitchell of his
appeal rights, omitted Hope Health's call from the investigator's phone log, and
presumably possessed medical records with the correct dates on them; these
factors supplied a strong inference that Fortis engaged in intentional deceit in
rescinding Mitchell's policy. 110
Next, the court utilized the second Gore guidepost-"the disparity between
the actual and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award" 1 -to determine the magnitude of Mitchell's potential injury and
whether the ratio of potential harm to the punitive damages award was
reasonable.1 12 The court looked to TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.113 to determine whether to compare the punitive damages award to the
actual harm suffered or to the potential harm suffered.1 14 TXO held that "it is
appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's
conduct would have caused to its intended victim . . . as well as the possible
harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred."' 15  Therefore, the court compared the punitive damages award to
Mitchell's potential harm rather than to his actual harm.116
Next, the court determined the dollar amount of Mitchell's potential
injury. 17 The court found that Mitchell's maximum payout of $6 million under
the rescinded olicy was too speculative to represent Mitchell's potential
economic loss. Instead, it concluded that Mitchell's potential harm was the
present value of the cost of treating his disease for the remainder of his life,
which was estimated at trial to be $1,081,189.40.119
The court then determined that the compensatory-punitive "ratio of 13.9 to
1, based upon the $15 million punitive damages award and $1,081,189.40 in
potential harm, [was] grossly excessive." 120 To determine the precise amount of
punitive damages, the court moved on to the third and final Gore guidepost. 12 1
The third guidepost, which directs courts to look at punitive damages awards
in comparable cases,122 led the court to reduce the punitive damages award from
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 585, 686 S.E.2d at 184 (citing BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
112. See id. at 590-92, 686 S.E.2d at 187.
113. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
114. Mitchell, 385 S.C. at 590-91, 686 S.E.2d at 187.
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$15 million to $10 million, or 9.2 times the compensatory damages.123 Although
no previous South Carolina case factually resembled Mitchell, the court did
consider several cases involving fraudulent rescission of health insurance
-- 124policies.
In 1933, in Jamison v. American Workmen Insurance Co.,125 the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld a punitive to compensatory ratio of 24 to 1.126
In 1937, in Riley v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee, 12 the South
Carolina Supreme Court allowed a ratio of 27.8 to 1. In 1954, in Yarborough
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Insurance Co. 129 the South Carolina Supreme Court
allowed a punitive to compensatory ratio of 133.3 to 1,130 and in 1960, in Kinard
v. United Co. of America, the plaintiffs punitive-compensatory damages ratio
was 6.5 to 1.13 A more recent examination of South Carolina punitive damages
case law, however, showed that punitive-compensatory damages ratios were in
the low single digits.133 Therefore, the court decreased the punitive damages
award from $15 million to $10 million.134 The court gave no specific
explanation for its calculation of $10 million but did note that "[Fortis's] conduct
... was reprehensible enough to merit an award towards the outer limits of the
single-digit ratio."l35
From one perspective, Mitchell changed little substantive punitive damages
law in South Carolina. South Carolina courts have used the Gore guideposts
often since their articulation by the United States Supreme Court in 1996,136
have acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's use of the de novo
standard, 137 and have cited to Campbell's reprehensibility considerations 13 8 and
123. See id. at 594, 686 S.E.2d at 188.
124. See id. at 592-53, 686 S.E.2d at 187-88.
125. 169 S.C. 400, 169 S.E.2d 83 (1933).
126. Id. 400-03, 169 S.E. at 83-84.
127. 184 S.C. 383, 192 S.E. 394 (1937).
128. Id. at 386-88, 192 S.E. at 395-96).
129. 225 S.C. 236, 81 S.E.2d 359 (1954).
130. Id. at 238-44, 81 S.E.2d at 360-63.
131. 237 S.C. 266, 116 S.E.2d 906 (1960).
132. Id. at 269, 116 S.E.2d at 907. In Kinard, the court reversed and remanded the case
because of erroneous jury instructions, but it did not address-and the defendant did not appeal-
the amount of the punitive damages award. Id. at 270-74, 116 S.E.2d at 907-09.
133. Mitchell, 385 S.C. at 593, 686 S.E.2d at 188.
134. See id. at 594, 686 S.E.2d at 188.
135. Id. at 593, 686 S.E.2d at 188.
136. See Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 361 S.C. 156, 164-66, 604 S.E.2d 385, 389-90
(2004) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996)); Duncan v. Ford Motor
Co., 385 S.C. 119, 142, 682 S.E.2d 877, 888-89 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-83);
Collins Entm't Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 355 S.C. 125, 140, 584 S.E.2d 120, 128
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-76); Lister v. NationsBank of Del., N.A., 329 S.C.
133, 151, 494 S.E.2d 449, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
137. See James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 195, 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2006)
(citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418); Atkinson, 361 S.C. at 166, 604 S.E.2d at 390 (citing Campbell,
538 U.S. at 418).
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single-digit ratio recommendations. 139 However, the court also has used Gamble
regularly, leaving practitioners unsure which test carried greater weight.140
Therefore, Mitchell can be considered a beacon in South Carolina punitive
damages law because of its clarity and guidance to practitioners.
As evidence of the confusion among practitioners by the pre-Mitchell test for
punitive damages, South Carolina attorney William J. Watkins Jr. wrote, in
2007, that:
Atkinson . . . failed to provide guidance on the status of the Gamble
factors. Today, trial judges and litigants conduct a Gamble review at
their peril. History and more recent U.S. Supreme Court case law
suggest that Gamble is an outmoded method of due process review and
should be discarded. A definitive word is needed from the [South
Carolina] Supreme Court to guide the trial bench and bar on due process
review of punitive damages.
In a recent interview discussing the effects of Mitchell, Mr. Watkins noted
that it was a welcome change for practitioners to no longer have the eight broad
Gamble considerations-of which lawyers did not know how many needed to be
proved-and instead have the three specific, concentrated Gore guideposts.142
Mr. Watkins opined that on the whole, the system with Gore as the predominant
test will be more streamlined and should serve the interests of justice more
effectively and efficiently for the parties, practitioners, and society.143
138. See Atkinson, 361 S.C. at 166-67, 604 S.E.2d at 390-91 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at
419); Duncan, 385 S.C. at 145, 682 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419).
139. See James, 371 S.C. at 196, 638 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25);
Atkinson, 361 S.C. at 170, 604 S.E.2d at 392 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424); Duncan, 385
S.C. at 145, 682 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425); Austin v. Specialty Transp.
Servs., Inc., 358 S.C. 298, 318, 594 S.E.2d 867, 877 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S.
at 425).
140. See James, 371 S.C. 194-95, 638 S.E.2d 671 (citing Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104,
111-12, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991)); Frazier v. Badger, 361 S.C. 94, 106, 603 S.E.2d 587, 593
(2004) (quoting Gamble, 305 S.C. at 111, 406 S.E.2d at 354) (citing Gamble, 305 S.C. at 111, 406
S.E.2d at 354); Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 306, 536 S.E.2d 408, 422 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Gamble, 305 S.C. at 111-12, 406 S.E.2d at 354). As one South Carolina practitioner said prior to
the Mitchell decision,
[s]o the question remains: do the Gamble factors form the appropriate framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive damages awards in South Carolina? South
Carolina case law is unclear on this point. Atkinson appears to have adopted the Gore
guideposts, but our trial and appellate courts seem unsure about dispensing with Gamble
factors.
Watkins, supra note 17, at 41.
141. Watkins, supra note 17, at 41.
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V. TI-E FAIRNESS IN CIVIL JUSTICE ACT OF 2011
The trend in South Carolina and many nearby states has been to construct
procedural roadblocks, through tort reform bills, in a plaintiffs trek to obtain
punitive damages.144 One of these roadblocks, enacted in 1988, is the clear and
convincing standard of proof required for obtaining punitive damayes. Over
the years this has proven to be a tough but fair hurdle for plaintiffs.
The Fairness in Civil Justice Act of 2009 was introduced in the house at the
beginning of the 118th session as another tort reform bill.147 The bill passed the
house in March 2010 by a vote of 89-10,148 but it died in the senate when the
118th session ended. 149 The house reintroduced the bill in January 2011, and in
February 2011, it passed by a vote of 100-11.150 The bill is currently under
consideration by the senate.
A critical purpose of tort reform bills is to promote and attract businesses to
the state by limiting potential punitive damages awards and reducing the
frequency of frivolous lawsuits. The Fairness in Civil Justice Act attempts to
achieve these goals by capping the amount of punitive damages at the greater of
three times the compensatory damages or $350,000.153 Additionally, the Act
provides that the cap is not applicable if the
144. See Punitive Damages, TORT REFORM REc. (Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Washington,
D.C.), July 1, 2010, at 19-31; Andrea Moore Hawkins, Note, Balancing Act: Public Policy and
Punitive Damages Caps, 49 S.C. L. REv. 293, 303 (1998) (citing Summary, TORT REFORM REC.
(Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Washington, D.C.), June 30, 1997, at 2).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (2005).
146. See Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 221, 479 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1996); Mishoe v. QHG of
Lake City, Inc., 366 S.C. 195, 200-02, 621 S.E.2d 363, 365-66 (Ct. App. 2005).
147. See H.R. 3489, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/hjO9/972.htm.
148. H.R. 3489, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/hj10/20100309.docx.
149. The last record of the bill in the senate journal is on June 2, 2010, when the senate read
the bill for a second time. See H.R. 3489, Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/sj10/20100602.htm.
150. H.R. 3375, S.C. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/php/web bhlO.php
?billl =3375&session 119&summary=B.
151. See H.R. 3375, S.C. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/php/web-bhlO.
php?billl=3375&session 119&summary=B.
152. See Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research
on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REv. 585, 585 (1988) (citing Coalition of
Business Requests Civil Law Reform, SPARTANBURG HERALD-J. (Spartanburg, S.C.), Nov. 3, 1986,
at B8) ("These changes are necessary, it is claimed, because there is a crisis in the tort system. It is
argued that dramatic increases in both the number of liability lawsuits and the dollar amount of
judgments in these suits have brought about sharp increases in liability insurance rates for many
businesses and professionals.").
153. H.R. 3375, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess119 2011-2012/bills/3375.htm.
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(1) trial court determines that the plaintiffs injury was proximately
caused by the defendant's conscious pursuit of a course of conduct
that the defendant knew would likely cause injury or damage or was
motivated by the pursuit of unreasonable financial gain;
(2) defendant pleads guilty to or is convicted of a felony arising out of
the same act or course of conduct complained of by the plaintiff,
and that act or course of conduct is a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs damages; or
(3) trial court determines that at the time of the plaintiffs injury the
defendant acted or failed to act while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, other than lawfully prescribed drugs administered in
accordance with a prescription, or any intentionally consumed glue,
aerosol, or other toxic vapor to the degree that defendant's judgment
is substantially impaired.
Suiorters of the bill argue that because North Carolina, 15 4 Georgia, 155 and
Florida 6 all have caps on their punitive damages awards, businesses are more
reluctant to locate in South Carolina than in its neighboring states for fear that
they will be hit with a large award.157 Logically, new businesses in the state
would demand employees. Thus, legislators may be backing the bill because
they want to demonstrate to their constituents that they are taking steps to foster
job creation.
Opponents of the bill argue that the cap would do little more than prejudice
hard-working individuals by limiting their potential awards if they bring suit
against businesses for reprehensible conduct. 158  Furthermore, from 2007 to
2008, only seven of the 136 personal injury verdicts in Greenville, Charleston,
and Richland counties included a punitive dama es award.159 Notably, five of
those seven awards were less than $7,000 apiece. Opponents, therefore, argue
that the bill is unnecessary. 16 1 Some also argue that companies rarely look at
state punitive damages law when deciding where to locate.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2009).
155. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2000).
156. FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (2005).
157. Gina Smith, House May Cap Damage Awards, THE STATE, Mar. 3, 2010, at Al.
158. See Gina Smith & Leroy Chapman, Jr., Punitive Damages Limit Wins, THE STATE, Mar.
4, 2010, at Bl.
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VI. WHAT THE FAIRNESS IN CIVIL JUSTICE ACT COULD DO TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
If passed, the Fairness in Civil Justice Act of 2011 will most affect
Campbell's single-digit ratio guideline. The single-digit guideline gives
deference to punitive damages that are less than ten times the amount of
compensatory damages awarded. The proposed legislation will reduce the
punitive-compensatory damages ratio to a maximum of 3 to 1, unless the
resulting dollar amount is less than $350,000. Aside from a relatively low
compensatory damages amount, the ratio could only approach 10 to 1 if the
defendant's conduct precluded application of the cap.
One may wonder if the legislature is overstepping its bounds by directing the
judiciary's approach to punitive damages review. However, some states,
including North Carolina and Alaska, have held that statutory punitive damages
caps do not violate separation of powers principles.163 In addition, Maryland's
federal district court held that "[t]he power of the legislature to abolish the
common law necessarily includes the power to set reasonable limits on
recoverable damages in causes of action the legislature chooses to recognize."1 64
A separation of powers argument against the Fairness in Civil Justice Act thus
appears unlikely to succeed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, a critical consideration regarding the Fairness in Civil Justice
Act of 2011 involves determining the appropriate balance between assisting
plaintiffs who may exaggerate their physical or economic injuries to obtain
punitive damages and companies who may use the predictability of a punitive
damages cap to determine what level of consumer injury is financially
acceptable.
Supporters of the punitive damages cap logically argue that it will bring
more enterprise and jobs to South Carolina. Nevertheless, legislators should
remember that the prospect of punitive damages did not deter BMW or Boeing
from entering South Carolina. Furthermore, they should be careful not to cater
to the needs of businesses such that they ultimately deny plaintiffs the ability to
recover damages for egregious acts.
Regardless of the final vote on the Act, Mitchell v. Fortis Insurance Co. has
done much to clarify punitive damages law in South Carolina and to increase the
efficiency of the state's judicial system.
Kyle A. Brannon
163. See Evans ex. rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055-56 (Alaska 2002) (citing Franklin
v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 (D. Md. 1989)); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594
S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 2004).
164. Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1336.
622 [VOL. 62: 607
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/3
